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Abstract 
We analyze the evolution of  fast emerging economies of the BRICS (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China & South Africa) and MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria & 
Turkey) countries, by assessing growth determinants throughout the conditional 
distributions of the growth rate and real GDP output for the period 2001-2011. 
An instrumenal variable (IV) quantile regression approach is complemented 
with Two-Stage-Least Squares and IV Least Absolute Deviations. We find that 
the highest rates of growth of real GDP per head, among the nine countries of 
this study, corresponded to China, India, Nigeria, Indonesia and Turkey, but the 
highest increases in real GDP per capita corresponded, in descending order,  to 
Turkey China, Brazil, South Africa and India. This study analyzes the impacts 
of several indicators on the increase of the rate of growth of real GDP and on 
the logarithm of the real GDP. We analyze several limitations of the 
methodology, related with the selection of the explained and the explanatory 
variables, the effect of missing variables, and the particular problems of some 
indicators. Our results show that Net Foreign Direct Investment, Natural 
Resources, and Political Stability have a positive and significant impact on the 
rate of growth of real GDP or on real GDP. 
JEL Classification: C52; F21; F23; O40; O50 
Keywords: Economic Growth; Emerging countries; Quantile regression 
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1. Introduction 
 The growing relevance of China in the world and the recent global 
financial crisis has led to an evolving stream of literature on post-Washington 
Consensus (WC) models. These include: a combination of the WC and the 
Beijing Model (BM) in a development consensus (Asongu, 2016a, 2016b); new 
development strategies based on a combination of the WC and other 
development models that have successfully advanced developing countries 
(Fosu, 2013a); the false economics of preconditions (Monga, 2014); the need 
for more self-reliance (Fofack, 2014); the New Structural Economics which 
sustains the need for a synthesis between liberalism and structuralism (Stiglitz 
et al., 2013ab; Stiglitz & Lin, 2013; Norman & Stiglitz, 2012; Lin & Monga, 
2011);  the Liberal Institutional Pluralism1 and the Moyo (2013) conjecture. 
Consistent with the Moyo conjecture, economic rights should be given priority 
at the early phase of industrialisation. Hence, the BM should take priority over 
the WC as a short-term development model2. This paradigm shift has motivated 
many developing countries to adopt strategies that steer clear of the WC.  
One of such moves is a decision by leaders of the BRICS (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China & South Africa) countries to establish a New Development 
Bank (NDB) at the recent July 15th 2014  BRICS summit in Brazil, which has 
led to a plethora of questions in policy and academic circles, inter alia: ‘What is 
the purpose of this BRICS bank? Why have these countries created it now? And, 
what implications does it have for the global development-finance 
                                                          
1
 The post-WC paradigm focuses on, inter alia: institutions for good public commodity delivery, 
diversity in institutions, and governance conditions for economic growth. More insights into 
this shift can be found in Fofack (2014, pp.  5-9),  Acemoglu et al. (2005), Rodrik (2008), Brett 
(2009) and Asongu and Ssozi (2016).  
2
 Moyo has defined the BM as “de-emphasised democracy, state capitalism and priority in 
economic rights” and  the WC as “liberal democracy, private capitalism and priority in 
political rights”. 
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landscape?’(Desai & Vreeland, 2014).  While these concerns have already been 
substantially engaged (Khanna, 2014; Griffith-Jones, 2014), what is quite 
apparent is that the BRICS would need to maintain a respectable economic 
growth rate to sustain the ambitions of the Contingency Reserve Arrangement 
(CRA) and NDB. This brings us to a key question of determinants of economic 
growth in these fast emerging economies. Accordingly, understanding drivers 
of growth in these countries holds several lessons for other developing 
countries.  
But before we engage the concern of understanding these drivers, it is 
important to briefly discuss the NDB and CRA.  According to the narrative, the 
former or BRICS bank has a 50 USD billion initial capital. The bank’s 
constitution is on equal-basis in terms of voting share because of an equal 
contribution of 10 USD billion from each of the five signatories. The capital-
base would be allocated to finance sustainable development and infrastructure 
projects in low- & middle-income nations as well as in the BRICS countries. 
The CRA of 100 USD billion is meant to provide more liquidity leverage to 
member nations in case they are faced with balance sheet issues. Contrary to the 
bank’s capital that is contributed equally among member states, the CRA is 
funded: 41% by China, 18% from Brazil, Russia and India and 5% from South 
Africa.  
 Consistent with the underlying literature on fast growing developing 
countries (Akpan et al., 2014; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2015; Asongu & Kodila-
Tedika, 2015), there are many benefits fast economic growth procures, among 
others: finance, employment and other positive externalities from a potentially 
increasing foreign direct investment (FDI) that is associated with appealing 
trends in managerial expertise, corporate governance and transfer of know-how.  
    According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development  
(UNCTAD, 2013), the BRICS and MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria & 
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Turkey) have been representing about 20% of global GDP and more than half 
of global FDI inflows over the past years (e.g. 2011 & 2012).  As presented in 
Table 1, in section 2, during the period 2001-2012, growth among the BRICS 
and MINT nations represented about 19% of world GDP, accounted for more 
than 51% of the population in the world and reflected about 30% of its FDI 
(World Bank, 2013). 
     In spite of the growing instrumentality of the nine fast developing countries 
in the global econnomy, to the best of our knowledge, very few studies have 
focused on the BRICS and MINT. Most studies have been based on 
determinants of FDI into these countries. These include, papers exclusively 
focused on the BRICS (Vijayakumar et al., 2010; Jadhav & Katti, 2012;  
Jadhav, 2012) and four studies oriented towards the BRICS and MINT (Akpan 
et al., 2014; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2015; Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2015; 
Asongu, 2016c).        
      Some studies have assessed drivers of growth in the underlying countries, 
while other studies have analyzed those drivers in samples that also include a 
more general international approach. The dependent variable in many studies  is 
the rate of growth of real GDP, while other studies select the value of real GDP 
or the value of real GDP per capita. The selection of the explained variable is 
important to select the units of measurement of the explanatory variables, as 
seen in Guisan(2015), in order to avoid mixing of rates of growth, shares on 
GDP, total current values, total real values and per capita values that may lead 
to unclear results. 
      Sheng-jun (2011) has investigated education as a driver of growth in the 
BRIC nations to conclude that whereas Russia and Brazil invest relatively more 
in education compared to China and India, growth is stronger in the latter set of 
countries. Basu et al. (2013) on their part have concluded that the potential 
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growth of the BRICS nations substantially depends on the capacity of its 
population to develop skills, especially in the working age. Agrawal (2013) has 
assessed the relationship between FDI and economic growth in the BRICS to 
conclude that there is a long-term relationship running from FDI to ecoomic 
growth. Goel and Korhonen (2011) had earlier addressed three questions in the 
BRIC, notably: “(a) How do medium term growth determinants differ from 
short term determinants? (b) What are differences between growth effects of 
aggregate versus disaggregated exports? And (c) Does lower institutional 
quality hinder growth?” Their findings indicate that, whereas nations of the 
BRIC have better growth, there are substantial within-group disparities. China 
and Russia for the most part show relatively higher growth, India sometimes 
reflected positive growth while Brazil failed to outpeform the other three 
countries. These disparities in growth naturally caution empirics on growth 
determinants to pay specific attention to high-growth and higher-growth 
nations.  
     Human capital has an important role in development as education and 
research have several direct and indirect positive effects, not only on the 
increase or real production per head, but also in socio-economic welfare 
(quality of government, women empowerment, and other variables), as it has 
been shown in interesting studies of international development as Guisan and 
Neira(2006), Guisan(2009), Tchamyou (2017, 2018) and other studies. 
    Usually some positive impacts of education on development are to increase 
the capacity to invest (both from domestic savings and from foreign origin), and 
to increase industrial production per head, with positive effects on other 
economic sectors, as seen in the macro-econometric approach of supply and 
demand presented in Guisan (2015) and in other studies. Besides human capital 
contributes, very often, to increase quality of government and other related 
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variables that usually foster socio-economic development, as seen in Guisan 
(2009) and other studies. 
 The present line of inquiry complements the above literature in at least 
three ways. 
First, the determinants of growth are assessed throughout the conditional 
distributions of growth. The intuition for this empirical technique is that growth 
among fast emerging economies may still be contingent on initial growth levels, 
such that growth determinants are different across high- and higher-growth 
countries. A Quantile regression (QR) estimation technique is employed to 
accommodate  this objective.  
Second,  MINT countries are added to the BRICS, consistent with recent 
literaure on fast emerging countries (Apkan et al., 2014).  
Third, the concern of endogeneity is addresed by instrumenting the 
determinants with their first-differences and first-lags.  Hence, the 
instrumentation process is dynamic. Moreover, it extends Asongu and Kodila-
Tedika (2015) who have assessed determinants of FDI in the MINT and BRICS 
using QR and instrumenting only with first lags.  
 The remainder of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 presents 
the data and methodology. The empirical analysis and results are covered in 
Section 3. Section 4 concludes with implications.  
 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data 
 We assess a panel of 9 BRICS and MINT countries with data from 
Apkan et al. (2014) for the period 2001-2011. The original sources are the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators and World Governance 
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Indicators databases. The adopted periodicity is also consistent with a recent 
stream of literature on FDI determinants in the BRICS and MINT (Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2015; Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2015). Two dependent variables 
are used for robustness purposes, notably: GDP growth and real GDP output.  
   Tables A1 and A2 in the Annexure relate the increases of GDP per head with 
manufacturing and other industrial activities in BRICS and MINT countries for 
the period 2000-2010. According to those tables, the highest rates of growth of 
GDP per head corresponded to China, India, Nigeria, Indonesia and Turkey, but 
the highest increases per year corresponded, in descending order,  to Turkey, 
China, Brazil, South Africa and India. It is important to notice that faster 
growth does not always imply higher growth of the variable (in units), because 
the rate of growth depends not only of the increase but also of the initial value. 
Thus, for the same increase the rate is higher when initial values are lower. 
    The highest levels of industrial and non-industrial production per head in 
year 2010, in Table A2, correspond to Turkey, Russia and Mexico, with real 
value-added per capita of industry over 4000 Dollars, and real value-added of 
non-ndustrial sectors over 8000 Dollars at 2005 prices and Purchasing Power 
Parities. 
Determinants of growth employed in the study which are classified in Table 2 
below are broadly consistent with the UNCTAD (2002) and Akpan et al. 
(2014). The retained determinants include: Gross FDI, Net FDI inflows, natural 
resources, infrastructure, private credit, inflation, political stability and trade 
openness. With the exception of high inflation that has the potential for 
decreasing growth, the expected signs from other determinants are positive. 
Accordingly, low and stable inflation is conducive for a positive economic 
outlook (Asongu, 2013a). 
  
9 
Table 1: Stylized facts on BRICS and MINT, years 2011 and 2012 
  GDP 
(const
ant 
2005 
US$, 
billion
s) 
GDP 
per 
capita 
(const
ant 
2005 
US$) 
GDP 
grow
th 
(ann
ual 
%) 
GDP 
per 
capit
a 
grow
th 
(ann
ual 
%) 
FDI 
net 
inflow
s 
(BoP, 
curren
t US$, 
billion
s)* 
Populat
ion 
growth 
(annual 
%) 
Populati
on, 
total, 
millions 
Natura
l 
resour
ces, 
Share 
of 
GDP* 
Human 
Develop
ment 
Index 
(HDI) 
Brazil 1136.5
6 
5721 0.87 
 
0.00 71.54 0.87 198.66 5.72 0.73 
China 4522.1
4 
3348 7.80 7.28 280.07 0.49 1350.70 9.09 0.70 
India 1368.7
6 
1107 3.24 1.94 32.19 1.26 1236.69 7.36 0.55 
Indonesi
a 
427.47 1732 6.23 4.91 19.24 1.25 246.86 10.00 0.63 
Mexico 997.10 8251 3.92 2.65 21.50 1.24 120.85 9.02 0.78 
Nigeria 177.67 1052 6.55 3.62 8.84 2.79 168.83 35.77 0.47 
Russia 980.91 6834 3.44 3.03 55.08 0.40 143.53 22.03 0.79 
South 
Africa 
307.31 6003 2.55 1.34 5.89 1.18 51.19 10.64 0.63 
Turkey 628.43 8493 2.24 0.94 16.05 1.28 74.00 0.84 0.72 
 Source of data: UNDP (2013), World Bank (2013) and Akpan et al. (2014). Data correspond to 
year 2012, but those marked with * are data o f year 2011. 
      
 FDI as a determinant is in line with Agrawal et al. (2014). The inclusion 
of both Gross FDI and Net FDI has a twofold motivation: (a) on the one hand, it 
is in accordance with the underlying FDI literature discussed in the introduction 
and; (b) on the other hand, it is meant to increase subtlety for more policy 
outcomes. Inflation measured as the annual Consumer Price Index and trade 
openness (annual imports plus exports as a % of GDP) are in accordance with 
Barro (2003).  
Private domestic or bank credit as a growth determinant is consistent 
with recent economic growth literature (Asongu, 2015; Nyasha & Odhiambo, 
2017) while natural resources (or share of natural resources on GDP) and 
political stability (in estimate) are in line with Tridico (2007) and Fosu (2013b).  
The choice of infrastructure is justified by the fact that, infrastructural 
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development has been established to ‘unidirectionally’ cause real output growth 
in China (Sahoo et al., 2010). The use of mobile phones (per 100 people) to 
proxy for infrastructure is in line with Asiedu (2002) and Sekkat and 
Veganzones-Varoudakis  (2007). 
 
Table 2: Classification of Growth determinants 
Determining Variables  Examples 
Policy variables Tax policy, trade policy, privatization policy, 
macroeconomic policy  
Business variables Investment incentives 
Market-related economic determinants Market size, market growth, market structure 
Resource-related economic determinants Raw materials, labor cost, technology 
Efficiency-related economic determinants Transport and communication costs, labor 
productivity  
Source: UNCTAD (2002) and Akpan et al. (2014) 
 
The summary statisitcs of the variables used in the study is presented in 
Table 3 below.  
Table 3: Summary Statistics of 9 countries for the period 2001-2011: 99 observations 
 Mean  S.D Min  Max Units 
      
Net Foreign Direct Investment Inflows (NFDI) 28.979 46.359 -2.977 280.07 Current  
Foreign Direct Investment (Gross FDI) 2.402 1.348 -1.855 6.136 Share GDP 
Real GDP Growth (GDPg, annual %) 5.351 3.789 -7.820 14.200 Rate of 
growth 
Log of Real GDP (constant of 2005 US billions)  6.346 0.886 4.260 8.341 Real (Log)  
Infrastructure  
(Number of mobile phones per 100 people) 
52.433 39.220 0.210 179.31 Per heads 
Bank Credit (Private domestic credit on GDP) 85.019 63.492 4.909 201.58 Share  
Natural resources (on GDP) 9.003 8.110 0.294 38.410 Share GDP 
Inflation (Consumer Price Index, annual %) 8.580 7.519 -0.765 54.400 Rate of 
growth 
Trade Openness (Import + Exports on GDP) 0.514 0.128 0.225 0.856 Share GDP 
Political Stability (Estimate) -0.826 0.613 -2.193 0.286 Kaufrmann 
units 
Notes : S.D: Standard Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Units of measurement: 
Current value of NFDI is in Bn USD. Shares of GDP are expressed in percentages of GDP. 
Rates of growth are the % of annual increase. Kaufmann units are the scales used by Kaufmann 
et al. for quality of Government, between -2.5 (the worst cases) and 2.5 (the best positions).   
 
Several of these variables may have a positive impact on industrial development 
per capita and other variables of interest for economic and social development. 
For example, FDI may be useful if it contributes to increase the degree of 
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development and/ or the quality of life of citizens (infrastructures related with 
sanitation, for example, with positive effects on health). Regarding the units of 
measurement, we must notice that the mixing of variables at current and 
constant prices, or the ratios between two variables with rates of real growth or 
per capita values, should be analyzed carefully in order to avoid misleading 
conclusions, as pointed out in the selected readings of Applied Econometrics 
methodology written by Guisan (2015). 
 
2.2 Methodology 
 In accordance with the literature on conditional drivers, in order to 
investigate if intiial levels of growth matter in the determinants of growth, we 
employ a quantile regression (QR) approcah, which consists of assessing 
determinants of economic growth throughout the distributions of eonomic 
growth (Keonker & Hallock, 2001; Billger & Goel, 2009; Asongu, 2013b).  
     Previous studies on the determinants of growth have reported parameter 
estimates at the conditional mean of economic growth. Some examples 
discussed in the introduction include: (a) Sheng-jun  (2011, p. 190-193)  that is 
based on  averages and (b) Goel and Korhonen (2011) which is focused on 
Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS).  
     Whereas mean impacts are important, the adopted QR approach is in line 
with the motivation of the present exposition. That is to say, it asssess how 
intial growth levels matter in the determinants of economic growth. For 
instance, while Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) suppose that growth and the 
error terms are normally distributed, the QR strategy is not founded on the 
assumption of error terms that are normally distributed. Therefore, the strategy 
helps us to assess the drivers with particular emphasis on the good and best 
candidates among the fast growing emerging countries. In this light, parameters 
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estimated are shown at several points of the conditional distributions of growth 
(Koenker & Bassett, 1978). This technique therefore incorporates the 
conclusions of Goel and Korhonen (2011) from the BRICS literature discussed 
in the introduction, notably: the need to distinguish  existing growth levels.  
 The QR technique is increasingly being employed in recent 
development literaure, inter alia: corruption (Okada & Samreth, 2012; Billger & 
Goel, 2009), health (Asongu, 2014) and finance (Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017) 
studies. A common shortcoming to the underlying applications is the concern of 
endogeneity. We address it by instrumenting the determinants in a twofold or 
dynamic manner. Accordingly, we instrument the determinants with their first 
lags and first differences. The fitted values obtained from the first-stage 
regressions are used in the second-stage QR specifications. Below are the two 
first-stage instrumentation processes.   
  tiitijti xx ,1,,                                                                             (1) 
  tiiititjti xxx ,1,   
                                                                   
(2) 
where: tix ,
 
 is a growth determinant for country i
 
at period t , i
 
is the country-
specific effects
 
 is a constant and ti ,  the error term.  The instrumentation is 
based on first lags and first differences in Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) respectively.  In 
the two equations, the estimation processes are based on Heteroscedasticity and 
Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard errors.  
     The second stage of the QR is presented in Eq. (3) below, where the  th 
quantile estimator of economic growth is derived by optimizing the following 
problem. We present Eq. (3) below without subscripts for the purpose of 
simplicity.  
    

  
 



 


ii
i
ii
i
k
xyii
i
xyii
i
R
xyxy
::
)1(min
                                    (3) 
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Where  1,0 . Contrary to OLS that is based on minimizing the sum of 
squared residuals, the QR procedure consists of minimising the weighted sum 
of absolute deviations. For instance, the 75th or 90th quantiles (with  =0.75 or 
0.90 respectively) by weighing the residuals approximately. The conditional 
quantile of economic growth or iy given ix is: 
 iiy xxQ )/(                                                                                                  
(4) 
where unique slope parameters are estimated for each  th specific quantile.  
Consistent with Asongu and Kodila-Tedika (2015), this formulation is 
analogous to ixxyE )/( in the OLS slope where parameters are 
examined only at the mean of the conditional distribution of economic growth. 
In Eq. (4), while the dependent variable iy  is an economic growth (GDP 
growth or real GDP) indicator, ix  contains: a constant term, Gross FDI, Net 
FDI, infrastructure, trade openness, inflation, private credit, natural resources 
and political stability.  
         For the purpose of robustness, we also report the results for Least 
Absolute Deviations (LAD) using the Gretl Software which should theoretically 
correspond to results of the 50th quartile based on the Stata software. It should 
be noted that contrary to mainstream QR findings that are complemented with 
OLS findings; in this study we have complemented QR estimates with 2SLS 
since the corresponding OLS follows an instrumental variable procedure. 
Specifications in Eq. (4) are tailored to control for overparameterisation and 
multicollinearity issues. For this purpose, the correlation matrix in Table 4 
enables the study to control for any potential concerns of high degrees of 
substitution among the instrumented independent variables.  
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Table 4: Correlation matrix on the loadings  
Panel A: Instrumentation with first lags 
           
IVInfra IVInfla IVCredit IVTrade IVPolS IVNres IVFDI IVNFDI GDPg RGDP  
1.000 -0.081 0.234 0.203 0.303 0.273 0.152 0.178 -0.320 0.177 IVInfra 
 1.000 0.010 -0.081 -0.268 0.077 -0.165 -0.278 -0.070 -0.344 IVInfla 
  1.000 -0.140 0.551 -0.490 -0.024 0.162 0.071 0.139 IVCredit 
   1.000 -0.344 0.336 0.246 0.219 0.145 -0.168 IVTrade 
    1.000 -0.240 0.162 0.241 -0.215 0.454 IVPolS 
     1.000 0.052 0.051 -0.084 0.064 IVNres 
      1.000 0.472 -0.037 0.223 IVFDI 
       1.000 0.240 0.711 IVNFDI 
        1.000 0.222 GDPg 
         1.000 RGDP 
Panel B: Instrumentation with first difference 
IVInfra IVInfla IVCredit IVTrade IVPolS IVNres IVFDI IVNFDI GDPg RGDP  
1.000 -0.122 -0.049 0.024 0.041 -0.008 0.173 0.066 0.019 0.077 IVInfra 
 1.000 -0.238 0.017 -0.058 -0.283 -0.063 -0.212 -0.074 -0.132 IVInfla 
  1.000 0.100 -0.021 0.342 -0.023 0.155 0.052 -0.068 IVCredit 
   1.000 -0.007 0.362 0.184 0.221 0.207 -0.059 IVTrade 
    1.000 -0.147 0.134 -0.089 0.037 -0.069 IVPolS 
     1.000 0.211 0.308 0.207 -0.059 IVNres 
      1.000 0.453 0.257 -0.004 IVFDI 
       1.000 0.453 0.333 IVNFDI 
        1.000 0.222 GDPg 
         1.000 RGDP 
IV: Instrumented Variable. Infra: Infrastructure. Infla: Inflation. Credit: Domestic Credit. PolS: Political Stability. Nres: 
Natural resources.  
 
While Panel A of the correlation matrix is based on first-lag instrumentation, 
the corresponding matrix in Panel B presents them in first difference. From a 
preliminary examination of the correlation coefficients, there does not appear to 
be ‘high degree of substitution’ concerns among the instrumented variables. 
Hence, we are confident that the estimated variables would produce signs that 
are not biased due to highly correlated independent variables entering into 
conflict. 
 
3. Empirical results  
In Table 5, we present findings which entail estimations from 2SLS, LAD and QR.  
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 Table 5: Panel A: Determinants of Growth Rate of GDP. Sample 90 obs. 
 Panel A1: Instrumentation with first lags 
 2SLS LAD Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
Constant 3.895** 2.603 2.458 0.725 2.603 5.637*** 4.979 
 (0.042) (0.333) (0.773) (0.788) (0.361) (0.003) (0.337) 
FDI -0.582 -0.302 -0.825 -0.385 -0.302 -0.882** -0.511 
 (0.332) (0.688) (0.808) (0.631) (0.692) (0.023) (0.497) 
NFDI 0.027*** 0.023 0.027 0.019** 0.023* 0.060*** 0.047*** 
 (0.000) (0.160) (0.312) (0.033) (0.051) (0.000) (0.000) 
Nresources 0.040 0.077 0.007 -0.005 0.077 0.078 0.020 
 (0.398) (0.433) (0.972) (0.936) (0.339) (0.188) (0.894) 
Infrastructure -0.037 -0.018 -0.073 -0.010 -0.018 -0.02*** -0.028 
 (0.001) (0.268) (0.199) (0.431) (0.195) (0.002) (0.238) 
Inflation -0.088 -0.088 -0.306 0.003 -0.088 -0.107** 0.005 
 (0.144) (0.489) (0.139) (0.968) (0.333) (0.032) (0.954) 
Credit 0.019** 0.024** 0.027 0.013 0.024** 0.024*** 0.017 
 (0.029) (0.011) (0.410) (0.256) (0.030) (0.001) (0.186) 
Trade 2.386 -0.146 6.308 3.113 0.146 -2.043 1.788 
 (0.446) (0.971) (0.602) (0.498) (0.976) (0.538) (0.849) 
Political Stability -2.154** -3.03*** -1.224 -2.153 -3.032** -4.05*** -3.163** 
 (0.025) (0.005) (0.727) (0.106) (0.013) (0.000) (0.015) 
R² 0.250 --- 0.254 0.156 0.189 0.260 0.318 
Fisher  4.717*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Log-likelihood -227.345 -222.069 --- --- --- --- --- 
       
 Panel A2: Instrumentation with first difference 
 2SLS LAD Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
Constant 27.810 81.832 -77.882 35.509 81.832 52.007 83.691 
 (0.559) (0.384) (0.717) (0.457) (0.239) (0.621) (0.467) 
FDI 0.169 -0.357 -0.256 1.077 0.357 0.583 -4.00*** 
 (0.765) (0.773) (0.892) (0.109) (0.680) (0.637) (0.007) 
NFDI 0.051*** 0.068* 0.039** 0.032** 0.068*** 0.054*** 0.050* 
 (0.000) (0.087) (0.038) (0.035) (0.000) (0.002) (0.082) 
Nresources 1.660* -0.281 3.567 2.206** -0.281 -0.025 -0.754 
 (0.066) (0.882) (0.139) (0.031) (0.835) (0.989) (0.512) 
Infrastructure -0.002 0.008 0.022 0.014 0.008 -0.026 -0.033 
 (0.875) (0.728) (0.768) (0.335) (0.684) (0.490) (0.244) 
Inflation 0.127 -0.046 0.363 0.223 -0.046 -0.370 -0.012 
 (0.551) (0.884) (0.364) (0.123) (0.857) (0.404) (0.968) 
Credit -0.455 -0.961 0.266 -0.885 -0.961 -0.432 -0.636 
 (0.379) (0.380) (0.917) (0.127) (0.248) (0.728) (0.627) 
Trade 7.520 14.396 56.17*** 40.85*** 14.396 -5.175 -0.073 
 (0.466) (0.577) (0.002) (0.000) (0.257) (0.829) (0.996) 
Political Stability 6.267** 0.2828 11.559 4.790 0.282 -0.028 3.133 
 (0.049) (0.968) (0.279) (0.307) (0.967) (0.997) (0.612) 
R² 0.164 --- 0.387 0.231 0.120 0.109 0.144 
Fisher  3.198 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Log-likelihood -232.20 -229.423 --- --- --- --- --- 
***; **;*: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. 
 Nresources: Natural Resources. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where Growth  is least.  
2SLS: Two-Stage Least Squares. LAD: Least Absolute Deviations. FDI: Gross Foreign Direct Investment.  
NFDI: Net Foreign Direct Investment Inflows.  R² is Adjusted for OLS and Pseudo for QR (Quantile 
Regression).  
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         Table 5.  Panel B: Determinants of Real GDP Output (log) 
 Panel B1: Instrumentation with first lags 
 2SLS LAD Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
Constant 7.894*** 7.44*** 8.38*** 7.972*** 7.443*** 7.55*** 7.666*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FDI -0.154 -0.173 0.121 -0.159 -0.17*** -0.15*** 0.374*** 
 (0.240) (0.197) (0.450) (0.141) (0.004) (0.004) (0.000) 
NFDI 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.010*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.01*** 0.025*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Nresources 0.017 0.024 0.045*** 0.034*** 0.024*** 0.002 0.006 
 (0.225) (0.150) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.794) (0.476) 
Infrastructure 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004 -0.0008 -0.001 
 (0.847) (0.865) (0.786) (0.737) (0.707) (0.499) (0.341) 
Inflation -0.022 -0.010 -0.11*** -0.05*** -0.010 -0.016 -0.013 
 (0.225) (0.742) (0.000) (0.000) (0.139) (0.187) (0.103) 
Credit -0.001 0.001 -0.003* -0.003*** 0.001 -0.001* -0.0008 
 (0.647) (0.664) (0.061) (0.004) (0.230) (0.094) (0.559) 
Trade -2.28** -2.04** -2.79*** -2.49*** -2.0*** -1.18*** 0.683* 
 (0.029) (0.020) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.062) 
Political Stability 0.365 0.289 0.448** 0.414*** 0.289*** -0.005 0.067 
 (0.146) (0.236) (0.038) (0.004) (0.003) (0.958) (0.418) 
R² 0.675 --- 0.554 0.505 0.463 0.476 0.617 
Fisher  24.14*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Log-likelihood -61.106 -63.745 --- --- --- --- --- 
Observations  90 90 90 90 90 90 90 
 
 Panel B2: Instrumentation with first difference 
 2SLS LAD Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
Constant 31.88** 35.357 13.083 0.006 35.357 42.184** 53.588 
 (0.015) (0.144) (0.315) (1.000) (0.137) (0.012) (0.399) 
FDI -0.447 -0.981* -0.430 -0.151 -0.981** -1.05*** -1.666*** 
 (0.152) (0.085) (0.109) (0.813) (0.010) (0.000) (0.002) 
NFDI 0.013*** 0.015* 0.019*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.020*** 0.020* 
 (0.000) (0.060) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.062) 
Nresources -0.175* -0.240 -0.088 0.080 -0.240 -0.174 -0.115 
 (0.093) (0.544) (0.863) (0.879) (0.587) (0.550) (0.906) 
Infrastructure 0.003 0.003 0.013* 0.007 0.003 -0.001 -0.006 
 (0.582) (0.491) (0.074) (0.465) (0.553) (0.596) (0.437) 
Inflation -0.058* -0.068 0.078 0.068 -0.068 -0.124** 0.021 
 (0.064) (0.371) (0.484) (0.602) (0.442) (0.013) (0.871) 
Credit -0.257* -0.277 -0.034 0.074 -0.277 -0.362** -0.483 
 (0.068) (0.326) (0.819) (0.843) (0.329) (0.066) (0.498) 
Trade -2.442 -3.038 -1.644 -3.300 -3.038 -1.175 -0.884 
 (0.119) (0.792) (0.889) (0.711) (0.501) (0.652) (0.994) 
Political Stability -0.359 -1.195 5.017*** 0.846 -1.195 -1.092 -0.145 
 (0.791) (0.573) (0.003) (0.756) (0.593) (0.426) (0.967) 
R² 0.107 --- 0.186 0.101 0.138 0.171 0.305 
Fisher  2.333** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Log-likelihood -106.636 -106.306 --- --- --- --- --- 
Observations  90 90 90 90 90 90 90 
***; **;*: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. 
 Nresources: Natural Resources. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where Growth  is least.  
2SLS: Two-Stage Least Squares. LAD: Least Absolute Deviations. FDI: Gross Foreign Direct Investment.  
NFDI: Net Foreign Direct Investment Inflows.  R² is Adjusted for OLS and Pseudo for QR (Quantile 
Regression).  
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        The 2SLS findings reflect baseline results on mean effects  that we 
compare with those of LAD and various quantiles in the conditional 
distributions of economic growth. 
Whereas the findings of Panel A are based on the economic growth rate, 
the dependent variable for Panel B is real GDP output. The Left-Hand-Side 
(LHS) and Right-Hand-Side (RHS) of either panels  are based on first-lag and 
first-difference instrumentation processes respectively. 
       Accordingly, Panel A1 (A2) are GDP growth determinants based on first 
lag (difference) instrumentation while Panel B1 (B2) are real GDP output 
determinants based on first lag (difference) instrumentation. All estimaions are 
robust in standard errors. In the interpretation of estimated coefficients, it is 
important to note that lower quantiles of conditional distributions in economic 
growth denote countries with lower initial growth levels.  
Comparisons of the results of different methods of  the estimations 
The following findings are observable in Table 5. First, the baseline 
2SLS results when compared with the corresponding QR estimates are 
significantly different in terms of significance and magnitude. This difference in 
findings justifies the need to complement 2SLS with QR estimates. Second, the 
instrumental variable (IV) LAD results are consistent with the 50th quartile 
across specifications and panels. This implies that the IV LAD results obtained 
from the Gretl software are in line with those of the 50th quartile from the Stata 
software.  
Second, Gross FDI shows a negative effect on economic growth, with 
the effect most apparent in top quantiles of the growth distribution. The 
interpretation is consistent across specifications and panels. It is interesting to 
note that the corresponding 2SLS estimates are negatively insignificant for the 
most part.  
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Third, the effect of Net FDI is positively significant, consistently for 
both 2SLS and QR estimates. Moreover, the magnitude of significance is higher 
in top quantiles of the growth distributions. This interpretation is broadly 
consistent across panels and specifications.  
Fourth, on the effect of natural resources, but for a slim exception (2SLS 
in Panel B1) it is broadly positive in the bottom quantiles of the growth rate 
distributions (25th quartile in Panel A2 and 10th decile to 50th quartile in Panel 
B1). It is also interesting to note that the decreasing tendency in ‘positive effect 
magnitude’ in Panel B1 means the positive impact of natural resources is more 
apparent in countries with initial high growth levels, but dissipates in higher 
growth countries.  It is important to take into account the limitations of this 
indicator as seen in the Annexure. 
Fifth, the impact of infrastructure is not very apparent because of 
overwhelming insignificant estimates. This finding is surprising, given that 
infrastructure is proxied by mobile phone penetration. Accordingly, mobile 
telephony has been documented to be substantially driving growth in 
developing countries (Sridhar & Sridhar, 2007, p. 37; Afutu-Kotey et al., 2017; 
Bongomin et al., 2018; Gosavi, 2017; Hubani & Wiese, 2017; Isszhaku & 
Wiese, 2017; Minkoua Nzie et al., 2017; Muthinja & Chipeta,  2017). It is also 
important to take into account the limitations of this indicator as seen in the 
Annexure. 
Sixth, the effect of inflation is sparsely significant, notably negative in 
the:  75th quartile of Panel A1, 10th  decile and 25th quartile of Panel B1 and 
2SLS, and 75th  quartile of Panel B2. The negative sign is consistent with the 
expectations of economic theory.  
 Seventh, whereas the incidence of bank credit shows a  positive impact 
for GDP growth, it shows a negative effect on real GDP output.  In Panel A1, 
the positive effect is apparent in 2SLS, 50th and 75th quartiles, while the 
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estimates are insignificant in Panel A2. On the other hand, in Panel B, bank 
credit has a negative effect in the: 10th decile, 25th and 75th quartiles   of Panel 
B1 and 2SLS and 75th quartile of Panel B2. These results may be related with 
the problem of units of measurement for this variable. 
Eighth, the effect of trade openness has some significant variations. For 
GDP estimations in Panel A, while it is not consistently significant in Panel A1, 
it is highly significant in the 10th decile and 25th quartiles of Panel A2. On the 
other hand, for real GDP output regressions, the estimations are consistently 
negative but for the 90th decile which is positive in Panel B1, whereas it is not 
consistently significant in Panel B2. These results may also be related with the 
problem  of units of measurement of this variable. 
Ninth, while the incidence of political stability shows a negative impact 
on GDP growth, it is positive on real GDP output. The negative (positive) effect 
is apparent only in top (bottom) quantiles of GDP growth (real GDP output).  
This variable has shown a positive effect on real GDP per capita, in several 
studies cited in the bibliography, but not necessarily on the rate of GDP growth 
or in the real value of GDP. 
Tenth, the goodness of fit is low in all the cases; in spite of the number 
of indicators included, what may be due in several cases to the problem of 
mixing rates, shares, current and constant values.  
 
Comments on the significant results of Table 5 
    Before we comment on the results of Table 5, it is important to bear in mind 
that GDP growth rates, for the same level of increase of income in Dollars at 
constant prices, are higher in low income countries, because the initial values 
are lower. Besides, some variables that may not show important effects on the 
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rate of growth or do not explain the changes in the real value of GDP may have 
important positive effects on the evolution of real GDP per capita.  
   Regarding the results of Table 5, for the rate of growth and the log of real 
GDP, we must be aware that higher rates of growth do not necessarily imply 
higher units of growth nor higher increases of real GDP per capita. Many 
variables, like infrastructures, quality of government and investment per capita, 
have positive effects on the increase and the level of real GDP per capita, even 
when they do not show a positive effect on the rate of growth of GDP.  
   For that reason we find that the usual methodology to try to measure the 
impacts of several indicators on the rate of growth, or in the real value of GDP, 
may have unclear results, and bad adjustments, for several reasons, like the 
mixing of variables in different units (rates, per capita, shares or others), the 
limitations of some indicators and the choice of the dependent variable. 
These are the main results from Table 5: 
1) First, we have observed that the 2SLS results are significantly different from 
the IV QR results. This implies that while mean effects may be important, 
median effects are also very relevant for policy implications. Hence, in the 
investigation of drivers of growth in emerging countries, it is important to 
account for initial levels of growth because blanket policy implications may not 
be effective unless they are contingent on existing growth levels and tailored 
differently across other high- and higher-growth nations.  
2) Second, we have also found that Gross FDI shows a negative effect on 
economic growth, with the effect most apparent in top quantiles of the growth 
distributions, likely due to the problem with the units of measure. A possible 
inference for this finding is that, in high-growth countries the outflow 
component of FDI in Gross FDI significantly decreases growth in terms of real 
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GDP output and GDP growth rate. Hence, we may naturally expect Net FDI 
inflows to exert positive effects on growth dynamics.  
3) Third, the effect of Net FDI is positively significant across specifications and 
panels, with the magnitude of positive significance greater in higher growth 
countries. This finding is consistent with the results on effects from Gross FDI. 
Two points are noteworthy here. On the one hand, FDI now exerts a positive 
effect on high-growth countries because of potentially negative effects of FDI 
outflows. On the other hand, FDI generally has a more significant impact in 
terms of magnitude in higher-growth countries. This inference is logically 
consistent with both the negative effects of FDI outflows and positive impacts 
of Net FDI inflows on growth dynamics. This brings us to the conclusion that, 
as much as countries with higher initial levels of growth benefit more from 
inward FDI relative to their low-growth counterparts; they are also susceptible 
to experiencing more deterioration in growth owing to outward FDI.  
4) Fourth, we have noticed that the impact of natural resources shows a positive 
decreasing magnitude. This broadly implies the positive effect of natural 
resources is more apparent in BRICS and MINT nations at the bottom quantiles 
of the growth distributions. As a policy implication, sampled countries need to 
improve on their management of natural resources with increasing economic 
growth, in order to reverse the decreasing positive trend of growth externalities 
from national resources.  
5) Fifth, the impact of infrastructure proxied by mobile penetration is not very 
apparent. This finding is contrary to mainstream literature documenting a 
positive effect of mobile phone penetration on economic growth (Sridhar & 
Sridhar, 2007). A possible explanation for this unexpected result could be the 
low usage of mobile phone for mobile banking activities in the MINT and 
BRICS nations (Mohseni-Cheraghlou, 2013). Global averages for ‘mobile 
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phone penetration’ (per 100 people), ‘mobile phone used to pay bills’ (% of 
adults) and ‘mobile phone used to send/receive money’ (% of adults) are 
respectively: 90.90, 3. 51 & 4.71. Corresponding rates in sampled countries are: 
Brazil (123.2; 1.3; 0), Russia (179.3; 1.7; 1.5); India (72; 2.2; 0.6); China (73.2; 
1.3; 0.6); South Africa (126.8; 4.4; 5.4); Mexico (82.4; 3.9; 1.5); Indonesia 
(97.7; 0.2; 0.6); Nigeria (58.6; 1.4; 9.9) and Turkey (88.7; 4.3; 2.2). Hence, the 
comparatively low employment of mobile phone for mobile banking purposes 
could explain its unexpected insignificant relationship with growth dynamics3.  
6) Sixth, whereas the incidence of bank credit shows a positive effect for GDP 
growth, it shows a negative effect on real GDP output.  Understanding why the 
underlying effects are conflicting is an interesting future research direction.  
7) Seventh, Table 5 shows that whereas the effect of political stability shows a  
negative on GDP growth, it has a positive impact on real GDP output. 
Moreover, the negative (positive) effect is apparent only in top (bottom) 
quantiles of GDP growth (real GDP output).   
  
4. Conclusions 
     The analysis of the evolution of BRICS and MINT countries for the period 
2001-2011 shows that these countries have experienced important increases 
both of real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and real GDP per head.  
      The highest rates of growth of real GDP per head corresponded to China, 
India, Nigeria, Indonesia and Turkey, but the highest increases, of real GDP per 
capita (per year, in Dollars at constant prices) corresponded, in descending 
order,  to Turkey (542), China (415), Brazil (214), South Africa (200) and India 
(136). The lowest increases of real GDP per capita corresponded to Indonesia 
(117), Russia (102), Nigeria (70) and Mexico (37). Although the increase of 
                                                          
3
 The interested reader can find more insights into the statistics on the following link : 
http://blogs.worldbank.org/allaboutfinance/mobile-banking-who-driver-s-seat 
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Nigeria is small, it implies a high percentage due to the low starting values of 
this country. 
     This study has analyzed the impacts of several indicators on the increase of 
the rate of growth of real GDP and on the logarithm of the real GDP. The main 
conclusions in this regard are the following: 
1) We have found several limitations regarding the usual methodology, 
what may be conducted to unclear results of the models.  
2) Some of the limitations have to do with missing explanatory variables, 
and with the units of measurement of each indicator. Other limitations 
are given for particular problems of some indicators.  
3) Finally, the effects of the explanatory variables are different according 
to the explained variable of the model: results differ if we try to explain 
the rate of growth of GDP or the value of real GDP.  
Regarding the results in Table 5, we have found positive and significant 
impact of NFDI in the four panels, and of other two variables in Panel A2: 
Natural resources and Political stability. 
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Annex 
     Table A1 presents the evolution of real value-added per capita of 
Manufacturing and Non-Manufacturing activities, as well of real Gross 
Domestic Product per capita of BRICS and MINT countries for the period 
2000-2010. Graph A1 shows the average annual increase of real production per 
head for the period 2000-2010. 
Table A1. Production per capita, annual increase and rate of growth (5), 2000-2010. 
Country 
name 
QMH 
2000 
QMH 
2010 
GDPH 
2000 
GDPH 
2010 
QNMH 
2000 
QNMH 
2010 
Increase 
Per year 
Rate ph 
Compound 
Brazil 1347 1307 7921 10056 6574 8749 214 2.42 
China 852 2181 2664 6816 1812 4635 415 9.85 
India 258 430 1718 3073 1460 2643 136 5.99 
Indonesia 760 931 2714 3880 1954 2949 117 3.64 
Mexico 2414 2239 12071 12441 9657 10202 37 0.30 
Nigeria 58 151 1456 2152 1398 2002 70 3.98 
Russia 3425 3322 23108 24124 19683 20803 102 0.43 
South Africa 1421 1137 7480 9477 6059 8340 200 2.39 
Turkey 3085 4435 17959 23382 14875 18948 542 2.67 
Notes: QMH and QNMH are, respectively,  manufacturing and non-manufacturing real value-added 
per head, while GDPH is the sum of both variables. Data of QMH, GDPH, QNMH in US Dollars at 
2005 Purchasing Power Parities (PPPs). The last columns are the average increase per year and the 
annual percentage of growth (calculated with compound rate).  Source: Guisan and Aguayo(2015), 
Guisan and Exposito(2015) and Guisan (2017 a b), elaborated from World Bank indicators. 
    In table A1, we may notice that the order of the countries is not the same if we use 
the highest increases or the highest rates of growth, because for a same increase a 
lower initial value implies faster growth (higher rate of growth). The highest rates of 
growth of ph corresponded to China, India, Nigeria, Indonesia and Turkey, but the 
highest increases, of real GDP per capita,  per year corresponded, in descending order,  
to Turkey, China, Brazil, South Africa and India.  
               Graph A1. Increase of real GDP per capita for the period 2000-2010 
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     Source: Elaborated with data of GDPH from table A1. Countries: 1. Brazil, 2. China, 3. 
India, 4. Indonesia, 5. Mexico, 6. Nigeria, 7. Russia, 8. South Africa, 9. Turkey 
     
Table A2 presents the percentage of real value-added of industry on 
Gross Domestic product and the real value-added of industry per head 
accordingly to WDI statistics (including not only manufacturing but also 
energy, mining and building), for year 2010. This table also presents the 
evolution of population for the period 2000-2010, as well as the values of 
investment and savings per capita in year 2010. Graph A2 shows the real-value 
per head of industrial and non industrial sectors in year 2010. 
 Table A2. Industry and non Industrial production per head, Investment and Savings per head 
(USD at 2005 PPPs) in  year 2010 and evolution of Population (millions) for 2000-2010. 
Country 
name 
%Industry 
2010 
Gdph 
Industry 
2010 
Gdp Non 
 Industry 
2010 
POP 
2000 
POP 
2010 
IH 
10 
SH 
10 
Dif 
10 
Brazil 27.38 2753 7303 173.9 194.9 1936 1663 -273 
China 46.40 3163 3653 1262.6 1338.3 3257 3608 351 
India 32.42 996 2077 1015.9 1224.6 1068 1036 -33 
Indonesia 42.78 1660 2220 206.3 239.9 1260 1240 -21 
Mexico 35.09 4366 8075 98.0 113.4 3106 3042 -64 
Nigeria 25.32 545 1607 117.6 158.4 465 777 313 
Russia 34.70 8370 15754 146.3 141.8 3240 3921 682 
South Africa 30.16 2858 6619 44.0 50.0 1825 1559 -266 
Turkey 27.98 6543 16839 67.4 72.8 2501 1708 -793 
Notes:. Population (million people). Investment per head (IH) and Savings per head (SH). GDP in Industry 
and Non Industry per capita in year 2010 (at 2005 prices and PPPs).  Dif=SH-IH is the difference between 
savings per head and investment per head in year 2010. Source: First column and Population from World 
Bank indicators. The second column was calculated applying the percentages of the first column of this 
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table to real GDP per head of table A1. The third column is the difference between GDP per head and 
industrial GDP per head. IH, SH and Dif elaborated by Guisan(2014) from World Bank statistics. 
     Graph A2. Real value-added per capita of Industry and Non-Industrial sectors in table A2. 
(Dollars per head at 2005 prices and Purchasing Power Parities) 
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        Source: Elaborated with data from table A2: Gdph in industry and Gdph in non industrial 
sectors. Countries: 1. Brazil, 2. China, 3. India, 4. Indonesia, 5. Mexico, 6. Nigeria, 7. Russia, 8. 
South Africa, 9. Turkey 
    
 In table A2 the highest levels of investment per capita (IH) in year 2010 
corresponded, in descending order, to China, Russia, Mexico, Turkey and 
Brazil.      Savings per head are higher than investment per head in China, 
Nigeria and Russia, and lower in the other six countries.  
      The highest levels of industrial and non industrial production per head in 
year 2010, in table A2, correspond to Turkey, Russia and Mexico, with GDPh 
of industry over 4000 Dollars, and GDPh of Non Industrial sectors over 8000.  
       
Comments on some indicators: 
Natural resources:Data of the Worldbank on Natural resource: Are based on 
the sources and methods described in World Bank(2011).  
“Statistical Concept and Methodology: The estimates of natural resources rents 
are calculated as the difference between the price of a commodity and the 
average cost of producing it. This is done by estimating the world price of units 
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of specific commodities and subtracting estimates of average unit costs of 
extraction or harvesting costs (including a normal return on capital). These 
unit rents are then multiplied by the physical quantities countries extract or 
harvest to determine the rents for each commodity as a share of gross domestic 
product (GDP).”License : CC BY-4.0. “Long Definition: Total natural 
resources rents are the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and 
soft), mineral rents, and forest rents.” 
Regarding this indicator we find that the values of their share on GDP is usually 
very low in many countries, because it does not include many natural resources, 
besides in some cases the annual data have too strong variations.  
Infrastructures: The indicator of number of mobile telephones seems not be 
enough to represent the differences of infrastructures in different countries and 
years. 
Worldwide Government Indicators: It includes interesting variables related with 
the quality of government and voices of citizens, but the indicators seems to be 
more adequate for studies where the explanatory variables is real GDP per 
capita, instead of studies explaining the rate of growth of the total real value of 
GDP. 
Missing variables 
For the model of real Output, it is important to include the effect of total human 
capital and total social capital. It is difficult to find of total social capital, and 
for that reason it may be advisable to choose the real output per capita as the 
explanatory variable and relate its values with the average years of schooling of 
adult population, and the indicators of social capital used in this study from 
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Kaufman et al. These variables have shown important positive effects on 
several studies cited in the bibliography. 
 
